dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.contributor.author | Aragonés, Enriqueta | fr |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Aragonés, Enriqueta | fr |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:21:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:21:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47127 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.title | Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a continuous policy space | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/book | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Book | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |