Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response to Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism.
Προβολή/ Open
Ημερομηνία
2023ISSN
2471-9560Source
Social Epistemology Review and Reply CollectiveVolume
12Issue
5Pages
33-41Google Scholar check
Metadata
Εμφάνιση πλήρους εγγραφήςΕπιτομή
At the heart of Mizrahi’s project lies a sociological narrative concerning the recent history of philosophers’ negative attitudes towards scientism. Critics (e.g. de Ridder (2019), Wilson (2019) and Bryant (2020)), have detected various empirical inadequacies in Mizrahi’s methodology for discussing these attitudes. Bryant (2020) points out one of the main pertinent methodological deficiencies here, namely that the mere appearance of the word ‘scientism’ in a text does not suffice in determining whether the author feels threatened by it. Not all philosophers use the term in ‘inherently negative’ (29) or pejorative ways. In this paper, I not only corroborate Bryant’s critical claim, but argue that Mizrahi’s response to this part of Bryant’s objection is inadequate.