Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses)

A distinguishing feature of today’s large-scale platforms for distributed computation and communication, such as the Internet, is their heterogeneity, predominantly manifested by the fact that a wide variety of communication ...

In this work, we study the impact of dynamically changing link capacities on the delay bounds of LIS (Longest-In-System) and SIS (Shortest-In-System) protocols on specific networks (that can be modelled as Directed Acyclic ...

We consider a security problem on a distributed network. We assume a network whose nodes are vulnerable to infection by threats (e.g. viruses), the attackers. A system security software, the defender, is available in the ...

We consider a strategic game with two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph G(V, E): v attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a defender, who chooses ...

We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case of a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n network users

We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical ...

In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection ...