• Article  

      The Price of Anarchy for restricted parallel links 

      Gairing, M.; Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2006)
      In the model of restricted parallel links, n users must be routed on m parallel links under the restriction that the link for each user be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. In a (pure) Nash equilibrium, ...
    • Article  

      A simple graph-theoretic model for selfish restricted scheduling 

      Elsässer, R.; Gairing, M.; Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2005)
      In this work, we introduce and study a simple, graph-theoretic model for selfish scheduling among m non-cooperative users over a collection of n machines
    • Article  

      Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria 

      Gairing, M.; Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Spirakis, Paul G. (2005)
      We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical ...
    • Article  

      Voronoi games on cycle graphs 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Lesta, Vicky Papadopoulou; Schoppmann, F. (2008)
      In a Voronoi game, each of a finite number of players chooses a point in some metric space. The utility of a player is the total measure of all points that are closer to him than to any other player, where points equidistant ...
    • Article  

      Weighted boolean formula games 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Wagner, K. W. (2007)
      We introduce a new class of succinct games, called weighted boolean formula games. Here, each player has a set of boolean formulas he wants to get satisfied. The boolean formulas of all players involve a ground set of ...
    • Article  

      Weighted Boolean formula games 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Wagner, K. W. (2015)
      We introduce weighted boolean formula games (WBFG) as a new class of succinct games. Each player has a set of boolean formulas she wants to get satisfied
    • Article  

      Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium? 

      Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Rode, M.; Spirakis, Paul G.; Vrto, I. (2003)
      A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such ...