• Article  

      Conditional value-at-risk: Structure and complexity of equilibria 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2017)
      Conditional Value-at-Risk, denoted as CVaRα, is becoming the prevailing measure of risk over two paramount economic domains: the insurance domain and the financial domain
    • Article  

      Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture 

      Feldmann, R.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Pieris, Andreas (2010)
      In this work, we continue the study of the many facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, henceforth abbreviated as the FMNE Conjecture, in selfish routing for the special case of n identical users over two ...
    • Article  

      Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2015)
      We consider strategic games in which each player seeks a mixed strategy to minimize her cost evaluated by a concave valuationV (mapping probability distributions to reals)
    • Article  

      Minimizing expectation plus variance 

      Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2012)
      We consider strategic games in which each player seeks a mixed strategy to minimize her cost evaluated by a concave valuation V (mapping probability distributions to reals)
    • Article  

      A new model for selfish routing 

      Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Rode, M. (2004)
      In this work, we introduce and study a new model for selfish routing over non-cooperative networks that combines features from the two such best studied models, namely the KP model and the Wardrop model in an interesting ...
    • Article  

      The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game 

      Fotakis, Dimitris A.; Kontogiannis, Spyros C.; Koutsoupias, Elias; Mavronicolas, Marios; Spirakis, Paul G. (2009)
      In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection ...
    • Article  

      The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game 

      Fotakis, Dimitris A.; Kontogiannis, Spyros C.; Koutsoupias, Elias; Mavronicolas, Marios; Spirakis, Paul G. (2002)
      In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection ...
    • Article  

      Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium? 

      Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Rode, M.; Spirakis, Paul G.; Vrto, I. (2003)
      A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such ...