Browsing by Subject "Social cost"

Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • Article  

      Facets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture 

      Feldmann, R.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Pieris, Andreas (2010)
      In this work, we continue the study of the many facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, henceforth abbreviated as the FMNE Conjecture, in selfish routing for the special case of n identical users over two ...
    • Article  

      A new model for selfish routing 

      Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Rode, M. (2004)
      In this work, we introduce and study a new model for selfish routing over non-cooperative networks that combines features from the two such best studied models, namely the KP model and the Wardrop model in an interesting ...
    • Article  

      The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost 

      Gairing, M.; Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard (2004)
      In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-studied KP model [18] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop model [31]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable, ...
    • Article  

      The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game 

      Fotakis, Dimitris A.; Kontogiannis, Spyros C.; Koutsoupias, Elias; Mavronicolas, Marios; Spirakis, Paul G. (2009)
      In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection ...
    • Article  

      The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game 

      Fotakis, Dimitris A.; Kontogiannis, Spyros C.; Koutsoupias, Elias; Mavronicolas, Marios; Spirakis, Paul G. (2002)
      In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection ...
    • Article  

      Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium? 

      Lücking, T.; Mavronicolas, Marios; Monien, Burkhard; Rode, M.; Spirakis, Paul G.; Vrto, I. (2003)
      A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such ...