dc.contributor.author | Raftopoulos, Athanassios | en |
dc.creator | Raftopoulos, Athanassios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-27T10:22:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-27T10:22:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/37611 | |
dc.description.abstract | I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on "object-centered" attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process. | en |
dc.source | Behavioral and Brain Sciences | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-4644291324&partnerID=40&md5=a4b85e5e845b2af85a2f33c8406dc35e | |
dc.title | Two types of object representations in the brain, one nondescriptive process of reference fixing | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.description.volume | 27 | |
dc.description.issue | 1 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 47 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 48 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Κοινωνικών Επιστημών και Επιστημών Αγωγής / Faculty of Social Sciences and Education | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Ψυχολογίας / Department of Psychology | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.description.notes | Cited By :1; Export Date: 20 July 2017 | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Behav.Brain Sci. | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Raftopoulos, Athanassios [0000-0002-6865-7127] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0002-6865-7127 | |