Corporate managers who face both strategic uncertainty and market uncertainty confront a classic trade-off between commitment and flexibility. They can stake a claim by making a large capital investment today, influencing ...

This chapter discusses the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in sequential investment settings. The focus is on two-stage competition models where real options analysis tools are combined with industry organization ...

This chapter shows how the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in investment games can exhibit a sequencing of investment timing. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.1 discusses the basic deterministic game-theoretic ...

This chapter discusses static market structure games. It begins by describing the benchmark case of a monopolist, developing the basic building blocks for subsequent models. It then introduces static models of duopoly, ...

This chapter extends the analysis began in Chapter 9 which was about simultaneous investment oligopoly markets. It considers the following industry structures: oligopoly situations where firms add capacity in lump sums

This chapter examines preemptive investments and the possibility of tacit collusion among firms, delaying investment until a later date. It first presents the original deterministic model by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to ...

This chapter first discusses the changing corporate environment, highlighting the need for firms to be careful when formulating their corporate strategies in an uncertain, competitive environment. It then explains how an ...