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Leadership and Early-Mover Advantage
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter shows how the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in investment games can exhibit a sequencing of investment timing. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.1 discusses the basic deterministic game-theoretic ...
Preemption versus Collaboration in a Duopoly
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter examines preemptive investments and the possibility of tacit collusion among firms, delaying investment until a later date. It first presents the original deterministic model by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to ...
Extensions and Other Applications
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter discusses new developments and applications of option games. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 13.1 deals with early approaches where competitive entry decisions are treated exogenously. Sections ...
Oligopoly: Simultaneous Investment
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter extends the analysis began in Chapter 9 which was about simultaneous investment oligopoly markets. It considers the following industry structures: oligopoly situations where firms add capacity in lump sums
Competitive Strategy: Options and Games
(The MIT Press, 2011)
Corporate managers who face both strategic uncertainty and market uncertainty confront a classic trade-off between commitment and flexibility. They can stake a claim by making a large capital investment today, influencing ...
Option to Invest
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter develops a simple framework that lets managers analyze strategic investment and quantify flexibility in a competitive setting in relatively simple terms. It examines the monopolist’s deferral option to identify ...
Innovation Investment in Two-Stage Games
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter discusses the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in sequential investment settings. The focus is on two-stage competition models where real options analysis tools are combined with industry organization ...
Monopoly: Investment and Expansion Options
(The MIT Press, 2011)
This chapter examines the situation faced by a firm with exclusive access to a market or enjoying insurmountable structural barriers enabling it to ignore strategic interactions by rivals when devising its investment ...