dc.contributor.author | Chevalier-Roignant, Benoit | en |
dc.contributor.author | Trigeorgis, Lenos | en |
dc.creator | Chevalier-Roignant, Benoit | en |
dc.creator | Trigeorgis, Lenos | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-24T06:29:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-24T06:29:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/46770 | en |
dc.description.abstract | This chapter shows how the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in investment games can exhibit a sequencing of investment timing. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.1 discusses the basic deterministic game-theoretic framework of Reinganum (1981) that shows why sequential, rather than simultaneous, investment emerges as the equilibrium when duopolist firms hold a shared investment option. Sections 11.2 and 11.3 consider the option to invest in a duopoly and in an oligopoly setting, respectively. Section 11.4 deals with the option to expand production capacity. Such investment-timing games can help explain firm leadership and early-mover advantage. | en |
dc.publisher | The MIT Press | en |
dc.subject | mathematical methods in economics | en |
dc.subject | capacity expansion | en |
dc.subject | competitive advantage | en |
dc.subject | duopoly | en |
dc.subject | investment timing game | en |
dc.subject | oligopoly | en |
dc.subject | sequential investment | en |
dc.title | Leadership and Early-Mover Advantage | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/book | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Λογιστικής και Χρηματοοικονομικής / Department of Accounting and Finance | |
dc.type.uhtype | Book | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Trigeorgis, Lenos [0000-0001-7367-2674] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7367-2674 | |