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dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.contributor.authorAragonés, Enriquetafr
dc.creatorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.creatorAragonés, Enriquetafr
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if votersʼ utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point of the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. Existence conditions require the variance of the distribution to be small enough relative to the size of the advantage.en
dc.sourceGames and Economic Behavioren
dc.titleCandidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy spaceen
dc.description.endingpage480Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and ManagementΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.contributor.orcidXefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288]

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