dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.contributor.author | Aragonés, Enriqueta | fr |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Aragonés, Enriqueta | fr |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:21:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:21:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47125 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if votersʼ utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point of the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. Existence conditions require the variance of the distribution to be small enough relative to the size of the advantage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Games and Economic Behavior | en |
dc.title | Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.description.volume | 75 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 464 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 480 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 464-480 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |