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dc.contributor.authorHadjiyiannis, Costasen
dc.contributor.authorHeracleous, Maria S.en
dc.contributor.authorTabakis, Chrysostomosen
dc.creatorHadjiyiannis, Costasen
dc.creatorHeracleous, Maria S.en
dc.creatorTabakis, Chrysostomosen
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the implications of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for interstate conflict. We set up a two-stage game with three competing importers, where first, two of the countries decide on whether to initiate war against each other, and subsequently, all three countries select their import tariffs. We show that PTAs produce both a “peace-creation” effect and a “peace-diversion” effect, whereby they reduce the likelihood of conflict between member countries (peace creation), but render the eruption of war between member and non-member countries more likely (peace diversion). This paper is the first to identify and explicitly model the peace-diversion effect of PTAs, and is also the only one in this literature to endogenize countries' terms of trade. We use data from the Correlates of War project to empirically test these predictions, and after controlling for endogeneity, we find robust evidence of both peace creation and peace diversion in relation to PTA establishment. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.en
dc.sourceJournal of International Economicsen
dc.subjecttrade agreementen
dc.subjectMilitary conflicten
dc.subjectpeace processen
dc.subjectpolitical conflicten
dc.subjectPreferential trade agreementsen
dc.titleRegionalism and conflict: Peace creation and peace diversionen
dc.description.endingpage159Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and ManagementΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.contributor.orcidHadjiyiannis, Costas [0000-0002-6660-7871]

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