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dc.contributor.authorHadjiyiannis, Costasen
dc.contributor.authorIris, Doruken
dc.contributor.authorTabakis, Chrysostomosen
dc.creatorHadjiyiannis, Costasen
dc.creatorIris, Doruken
dc.creatorTabakis, Chrysostomosen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:22:12Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:22:12Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47376
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity for self-enforcing international environmental agreements on pollution abatement. Reciprocal countries reward fair behavior (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unfairly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that have moderate expectations from each other with respect to their national abatement strategies can support a greater degree of environmental cooperation than self-interested ones. However, when only very high abatement standards are deemed fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on international environmental cooperation. Our model therefore provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in environmental negotiations. Copyright © 2012 De Gruyter. All rights reserved.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceB.E.Journal of Economic Analysis and Policyen
dc.subjectReciprocityen
dc.subjectAbatement standardsen
dc.subjectEnvironmental agreementsen
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen
dc.titleInternational environmental cooperation under fairness and reciprocityen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1515/1935-1682.2917
dc.description.volume12
dc.description.startingpage1
dc.description.endingpage30
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidHadjiyiannis, Costas [0000-0002-6660-7871]
dc.description.totalnumpages1-30


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