dc.contributor.author | Hassapis, Christis | en |
dc.creator | Hassapis, Christis | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:22:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:22:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47395 | |
dc.description.abstract | The question on how bureaucrats behave in the provision of a public service has been the subject of a considerable amount of research, most of which has been largely theoretical and inconclusive, especially on the issue of efficiency. This paper builds a bureaucratic theoretical model and provides empirical evidence by examining the workings of a government bureau, supplying a public service, namely Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), at the state level. It builds and estimates a generalized short run cost function that allows for systematic relative price inefficiency and does not require cost minimization subject to market prices as a maintained hypothesis. The model tests cost minimization as a testable special case. The estimating procedure allows us to test for a number of other features of the technology that are of interest such as productivity growth, marginal costs, returns to scale, technical change, and factor demands. © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Public Choice | en |
dc.title | Are bureaucrats efficient? An application to the provision of AFDC | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/BF00114880 | |
dc.description.volume | 86 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 157 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 174 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Hassapis, Christis [0000-0002-7808-270X] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 157-174 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0002-7808-270X | |