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dc.contributor.authorKoutsougeras, Leonidas C.en
dc.contributor.authorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.creatorKoutsougeras, Leonidas C.en
dc.creatorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:22:27Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:22:27Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47541
dc.description.abstractThe standard version of the second welfare theorem assumes that market operations produce Walrasian outcomes. Therefore, if there are individuals who can manipulate prices, the conclusion of the second welfare theorem is questionable. In this paper, we address the decentralization of a Pareto-optimal allocation, when markets are non-Walrasian. Our objective in this paper is to develop a game which can implement Pareto-optimal allocations as Nash equilibria of strategic exchange in markets. In this way, we develop a version of the second welfare theorem for economies where markets are strategic. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceJournal of Public Economic Theoryen
dc.titleThe Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non-Walrasian Marketsen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jpet.12128
dc.description.volume17
dc.description.startingpage415
dc.description.endingpage432
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidZiros, Nicholas [0000-0002-6485-1491]
dc.description.totalnumpages415-432


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