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dc.contributor.authorKoutsougeras, Leonidas C.en
dc.contributor.authorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.creatorKoutsougeras, Leonidas C.en
dc.creatorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:22:27Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:22:27Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47542
dc.description.abstractWe show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretation of asymptotic core convergence, namely the emergence of price taking. © 2011.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceJournal of Mathematical Economicsen
dc.subjectAsymptotic proximityen
dc.subjectCoreen
dc.subjectDecentralizationen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.titleNon-Walrasian decentralization of the coreen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.08.001
dc.description.volume47
dc.description.startingpage610
dc.description.endingpage616
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidZiros, Nicholas [0000-0002-6485-1491]
dc.description.totalnumpages610-616
dc.gnosis.orcid0000-0002-6485-1491


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