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dc.contributor.authorMatakos, Konstantinosen
dc.contributor.authorTroumpounis, Orestisen
dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.creatorMatakos, Konstantinosen
dc.creatorTroumpounis, Orestisen
dc.creatorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.description.abstractThis chapter presents a formal model of electoral competition where parties’ platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of the electoral rule disproportionality. We first show that proportional electoral systems generate centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation. This in turn implies that more proportional systems are associated with lower levels of abstention from indifference. This two-step theoretical prediction of the effect of electoral systems on turnout is then empirically validated even when we jointly control for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. Thus, our work highlights an additional link in the proportionality-turnout nexus.en
dc.sourceThe Political Economy of Governanceen
dc.titleTurnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systemsen
dc.description.endingpage362Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and ManagementΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.contributor.orcidXefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288]

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