dc.contributor.author | Nunez, Matias | en |
dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Nunez, Matias | en |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:22:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:22:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/47702 | |
dc.description.abstract | We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative | en |
dc.description.abstract | and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum – including the Condorcet winner alternative – there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature. © 2017 Elsevier Inc. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Journal of Economic Theory | en |
dc.subject | Approval voting | en |
dc.subject | Condorcet winner | en |
dc.subject | Nash implementation | en |
dc.subject | Single-peakedness | en |
dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | en |
dc.title | Implementation via approval mechanisms | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003 | |
dc.description.volume | 170 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 169 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 181 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 169-181 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |