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dc.contributor.authorSessions, John G.en
dc.contributor.authorTheodoropoulos, Nikolaosen
dc.creatorSessions, John G.en
dc.creatorTheodoropoulos, Nikolaosen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:23:10Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:23:10Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48008
dc.description.abstractEfficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and/or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we develop a two-period model of efficiency wages in which increased monitoring attenuates the gradient of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction. Copyright © 2013 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceResearch in Labor Economicsen
dc.subjectEfficiency wagesen
dc.subjectMonitoringen
dc.subjectTenureen
dc.titleTenure, wage profiles and monitoringen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038004
dc.description.volume38
dc.description.startingpage105
dc.description.endingpage162
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidTheodoropoulos, Nikolaos [0000-0002-0415-6534]
dc.description.totalnumpages105-162
dc.gnosis.orcid0000-0002-0415-6534


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