dc.contributor.author | Sessions, John G. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos | en |
dc.creator | Sessions, John G. | en |
dc.creator | Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:23:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:23:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48008 | |
dc.description.abstract | Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and/or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we develop a two-period model of efficiency wages in which increased monitoring attenuates the gradient of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction. Copyright © 2013 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Research in Labor Economics | en |
dc.subject | Efficiency wages | en |
dc.subject | Monitoring | en |
dc.subject | Tenure | en |
dc.title | Tenure, wage profiles and monitoring | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038004 | |
dc.description.volume | 38 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 105 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 162 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos [0000-0002-0415-6534] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 105-162 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0002-0415-6534 | |