dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:23:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:23:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48042 | |
dc.description.abstract | We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (. Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This paper shows that these games might also have only asymmetric equilibria. One of the examples employed to illustrate this point is the three-candidate version of the popular Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition. This demonstrates that symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria are not technical paradoxes but are integrated in economics and political science literature for quite a while. © 2014 Elsevier Inc. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Games and Economic Behavior | en |
dc.subject | Symmetric equilibrium | en |
dc.subject | Symmetric game | en |
dc.subject | Zero-sum game | en |
dc.title | Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.001 | |
dc.description.volume | 89 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 122 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 125 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 122-125 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |