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dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.creatorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.description.abstractThis article strengthens existing analysis concerning the effectiveness of majority rule. It demonstrates a one-to-one equivalence between the basic issue of social choice theory (the problem of selection of a well-functioning social choice rule [SCR]) and the problems that majority rule faces (it fails decisiveness in certain preference profiles). It is shown that whenever an SCR works well, majority rule works well, and in these circumstances, the SCR yields the same outcome as majority rule. So whenever majority rule works we can never do better by choosing an alternative SCR. When majority rule does not work well, then any other SCR will face a serious problem, too. The article defines the conditions underlying the concept of an SCR working well that enables these results to be established. © Oxford University Press 2014.en
dc.sourceOxford Economic Papersen
dc.subjecttheoretical studyen
dc.subjectvoting behavioren
dc.subjectconceptual frameworken
dc.subjectsocial theoryen
dc.titleHow robust is majority voting as a social choice rule?en
dc.description.endingpage1018Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and ManagementΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.contributor.orcidXefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288]

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