Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions

Abstract

This note complements Aragonès and Palfrey [Aragonés, E., Palfrey, T., 2002. Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate. Journal of Economic Theory 103, 131-161.] and Hummel [Hummel, P., 2010. On the nature of equilibriums in a Downsian model with candidate valence. Games and Economic Behavior 70 (2), 425-445.] by characterizing an essentially unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-candidate Downsian model where one candidate enjoys a non-minimal non-policy advantage over the other candidate. The policy space is unidimensional and discrete (even number of equidistant locations), the preferences of the median voter are not known to the candidates and voter’s preferences on the policy space are represented by linear loss functions. We find that if the uncertainty about the median voter’s preferences is sufficiently low, then the mixed strategy