dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:23:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:23:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48052 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies unidimensional electoral competition between two office-motivated candidates, where one of them enjoys a probabilistic and non-policy advantage over the other. We consider a finite number of voters who have single peaked preferences and whose ideal policies are not known to the candidates. Unlike the deterministic-advantage models we find that the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium is in this environment the unique Nash equilibrium of the game when the electorate is sufficiently large. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Economics Letters | en |
dc.subject | Candidate quality | en |
dc.subject | Spatial competition | en |
dc.subject | Probabilistic advantage | en |
dc.title | Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.022 | |
dc.description.volume | 116 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 96 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 98 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 96-98 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |