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dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.creatorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:23:14Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:23:14Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48054
dc.description.abstractThis note complements Aragonès and Palfrey (2002) [2] by providing upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff of the advantaged (disadvantaged) candidate for any symmetric distribution of the median voter's ideal policy and any (even or odd) number of equidistant locations. These bounds point to a negative (positive) relationship between the equilibrium payoff of the (dis)advantaged candidate and the uncertainty regarding the median voter's preferences. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceJournal of Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectCandidate qualityen
dc.subjectMixed strategiesen
dc.subjectSpatial competitionen
dc.titleMixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: A commenten
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.008
dc.description.volume147
dc.description.startingpage393
dc.description.endingpage396
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidXefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288]
dc.description.totalnumpages393-396


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