dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-03T05:23:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-03T05:23:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48056 | |
dc.description.abstract | The result of a referendum delivers a significant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice of an authority not to offer a referendum, although permitted to do so, may enhance the information individuals posses about social preferences as well. The addition of a referendum option in the rules of a game, that is, by enabling the authority to offer referenda at will, results in an assured re-election of the authorities that implement socially beneficial policies and reduces the likelihood of the re-election of the authorities that implement socially detrimental policies. In a sense, by allowing an authority to offer referenda, an inescapable Catch-22 is introduced in the game, which inhibits the re-election of a measure of "bad" authorities and, thus, confirms that one of the main benefits of a democratic institution is the preservation of "good" authorities in power. It is, finally, demonstrated that non-binding referenda are more influential (in the directions described above) than binding referenda as far as the authority's re-election prospect is concerned. © 2010 Springer-Verlag. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.source | Social Choice and Welfare | en |
dc.title | Referenda as a Catch-22 | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00355-010-0483-4 | |
dc.description.volume | 37 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 121 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 138 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.description.totalnumpages | 121-138 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |