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dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.contributor.authorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.creatorXefteris, Dimitriosen
dc.creatorZiros, Nicholasen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T05:23:15Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T05:23:15Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/48063
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). Moreover, we argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.sourceAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomicsen
dc.titleStrategic vote trading in power sharing systemsen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.20150254
dc.description.volume9
dc.description.startingpage76
dc.description.endingpage94
dc.author.facultyΣχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics
dc.type.uhtypeArticleen
dc.contributor.orcidXefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288]
dc.contributor.orcidZiros, Nicholas [0000-0002-6485-1491]
dc.description.totalnumpages76-94


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