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dc.contributor.authorKakas, Antonis C.en
dc.contributor.editorLakemeyer G.en
dc.contributor.editorNebel B.en
dc.creatorKakas, Antonis C.en
dc.description.abstractWe show how recent developments in the study of negation as failure of Logic Programming can be used to define a general framework for Default Reasoning. Negation as failure can be viewed as a form of hypotheses with which we extend the underlying theory, given by the logic program, provided that this extension satisfies an appropriate criterion, called acceptability. The generalization of logic programming to more general representation frameworks is done by adapting this view of NAF and the basic notion of acceptability to the new frameworks. In general, an extension of a given theory by a set of hypotheses (e.g. defaults) is acceptable if it can render any other conflicting extension not acceptable thus ensuring that it is a “selfjustified” set of assumptions. We compare our framework with other existing non-monotonic frameworks such as Default Logic and Theorist. In particular, we will show how our framework includes and extends Default Logic. © 1994, Springer Verlag. All rights reserved.en
dc.sourceWorkshop on Theoretical Foundations of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning held in conjunction with 10th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 1992en
dc.subjectComputer circuitsen
dc.subjectLogic programmingen
dc.subjectKnowledge representationen
dc.subjectLogic programsen
dc.subjectDefault logicen
dc.subjectDefault reasoningen
dc.subjectNegation as failuresen
dc.titleDefault reasoning via negation as failureen
dc.description.volume810 LNAIen
dc.description.endingpage178 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied SciencesΤμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science
dc.description.notesConference code: 155009en
dc.description.notesCited By :6</p>en
dc.source.abbreviationLect. Notes Comput. Sci.en
dc.contributor.orcidKakas, Antonis C. [0000-0001-6773-3944]

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