dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-25T09:10:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-25T09:10:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-7101 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/62941 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies electoral competition between two purely office-motivated and heterogeneous (in terms of valence) established candidates when the entry of a lesser-valence third candidate is anticipated. In this model, when the valence asymmetries among candidates are not very large, an essentially unique equilibrium always exists and it is such that: (a) the two established candidates employ pure strategies, (b) the high-valence established candidate offers a more moderate platform than the low-valence established candidate, (c) the entrant locates between the two established candidates and nearer to the established high-valence candidate and, surprisingly, (d) both established candidates receive equal vote-shares. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.source | Public Choice | en |
dc.source.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0549-x | |
dc.title | Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11127-018-0549-x | |
dc.description.volume | 176 | |
dc.description.issue | 3 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 341 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 359 | |
dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Public Choice | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |