| dc.contributor.author | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
| dc.creator | Xefteris, Dimitrios | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-25T09:10:06Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-01-25T09:10:06Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/62949 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study a general multiparty model of plurality rule elections with costly participation, and prove that strategic voting – that is, situations in which some voters abandon their most preferred alternative and vote strategically for the serious contender they dislike less – may emerge in equilibrium | en |
| dc.description.abstract | just like when participation is costless/compulsory (Palfrey, 1989). This qualifies opposite claims made in more confined setups (e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017), and establishes that Duverger's psychological effect is present in a much larger set of cases than currently believed. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.source | Games and Economic Behavior | en |
| dc.source.uri | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619300600 | |
| dc.title | Strategic voting when participation is costly | en |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010 | |
| dc.description.volume | 116 | |
| dc.description.startingpage | 122 | |
| dc.description.endingpage | 127 | |
| dc.author.faculty | Σχολή Οικονομικών Επιστημών και Διοίκησης / Faculty of Economics and Management | |
| dc.author.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών / Department of Economics | |
| dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
| dc.source.abbreviation | Games and Economic Behavior | en |
| dc.contributor.orcid | Xefteris, Dimitrios [0000-0001-7397-5288] | |
| dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-7397-5288 | |
