The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Functioning of Institutions: the Cypriot Experience

Abstract

The impact of the financial crisis on the constitutional orders of the Member States and on the rights of the citizens have been the subjects of extensive and deep analysis. The theme is multidimensional and complex and is directly correlated to numerous fundamental constitutional concepts that are central to the description of the relational system that governs the symbiosis between the national and the supranational legal orders. For instance, in the era of constitutional pluralism the structuring of constitutional coexistence is described with reference to the concepts of legitimacy, constitutional identity and autonomy, allocation of competence and the principle of hierarchical primacy of application in the event of conflicting norms. What is often sidelined is the fundamental reality that the participating constitutional systems are essentially divergent in their approaches. This has been accurately described as “troubled asymmetries” especially in relation to the role that is constitutional reserved for the legislature. Consequently, the impact of a supranational norm is not uniform and can be varied depending on the constitutional setting that implements and/or applies the norm in question. Moreover, the “impact diversity” is also affected by the fact that as a result of the financial crisis there are constitutional orders that perform the role of the lender and constitutional orders that are put in the position of a debtor. Therefore, a picture of fragmentation and differentiation is created within the same institutional and normative framework of cooperating national and supranational orders. Moreover, the stepping-stone for analyzing that complex state of affairs is the realization that the EU dimension was intentionally sidelined through the selected architecture for the mechanisms entrusted with the financing of the national debt problems.