dc.contributor.author | Antoniou, Josephina | en |
dc.contributor.author | Koukoutsidis, I. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Jaho, E. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pitsillides, Andreas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Stavrakakis, I. | en |
dc.creator | Antoniou, Josephina | en |
dc.creator | Koukoutsidis, I. | en |
dc.creator | Jaho, E. | en |
dc.creator | Pitsillides, Andreas | en |
dc.creator | Stavrakakis, I. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-13T10:38:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-13T10:38:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1389-1286 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/53550 | |
dc.description.abstract | In next generation communication networks, multiple access networks will coexist on a common service platform. In cases where network resource planning indicates that individual access network resources are insufficient to meet service demands, these networks can cooperate and combine their resources to form a unified network that satisfies these demands. We introduce and study the Network Synthesis game, in which individual access networks with insufficient resources form coalitions in order to satisfy service demands. The formation of stable coalitions in the core of the game is investigated, in both cases where payoffs are transferable or are attributed in proportion to the contribution of each member of the coalition. We also consider an alternative payoff allocation approach, according to the value of the well-known Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and Holler-Packel power indices, which represent the relative power each player has in the formation of coalitions. Using the knowledge attained from the coalition game analysis, we propose a new power index, called Popularity Power Index, which is based on the number of stable coalitions an access network would participate in if payoffs were assigned in a fair manner. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en |
dc.source | Computer Networks | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-68349114926&doi=10.1016%2fj.comnet.2009.06.006&partnerID=40&md5=021914d0c4585ccdc37ab25a333e71c7 | |
dc.subject | Game theory | en |
dc.subject | Resource allocation | en |
dc.subject | Network synthesis | en |
dc.subject | Access network | en |
dc.subject | Access network synthesis | en |
dc.subject | Allocation approach | en |
dc.subject | Coalition game | en |
dc.subject | Coalitions | en |
dc.subject | Multiple access network | en |
dc.subject | Network resource | en |
dc.subject | Next generation communication network | en |
dc.subject | Next generation network | en |
dc.subject | Next generation networks | en |
dc.subject | Power indices | en |
dc.subject | Service demand | en |
dc.subject | Service platforms | en |
dc.subject | Stable coalition | en |
dc.title | Access network synthesis game in next generation networks | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.comnet.2009.06.006 | |
dc.description.volume | 53 | |
dc.description.issue | 15 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 2716 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 2726 | |
dc.author.faculty | 002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Comput.Networks | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Pitsillides, Andreas [0000-0001-5072-2851] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-5072-2851 | |