dc.contributor.author | Christoforou, Evgenia | en |
dc.contributor.author | Fernández Anta, Antonio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Georgiou, Chryssis | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mosteiro, Miguel A. | en |
dc.creator | Christoforou, Evgenia | en |
dc.creator | Fernández Anta, Antonio | en |
dc.creator | Georgiou, Chryssis | en |
dc.creator | Mosteiro, Miguel A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-13T10:39:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-13T10:39:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-0-7695-4489-2 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/53737 | |
dc.description.abstract | This work, using a game-theoretic approach, considers Internet-based computations, where a master processor assigns, over the Internet, a computational task to a set of untrusted worker processors, and collects their responses. The master must obtain the correct task result, while maximizing its benefit. Building on prior work, we consider a framework where altruistic, malicious, and rational workers co-exist. In addition, we consider the possibility that the communication between the master and the workers is not reliable, and that workers could be unavailable | en |
dc.description.abstract | assumptions that are very realistic for Internet-based master-worker computations. Within this framework, we design and analyze two algorithmic mechanisms that provide, when necessary, appropriate incentives to rational workers to act correctly, despite the malicious' workers actions and the unreliability of the network. These mechanisms are then applied to two realistic Internet-based master-worker settings, a SETI-like one and a contractor-based one, such as Amazon's mechanical turk. © 2011 IEEE. | en |
dc.source | Proceedings - 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2011 | en |
dc.source | 10th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2011 | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-80055016235&doi=10.1109%2fNCA.2011.46&partnerID=40&md5=ac0b3936b82943d15fb8d594583712cb | |
dc.subject | Internet | en |
dc.subject | Task performance | en |
dc.subject | Game theory | en |
dc.subject | Algorithms | en |
dc.subject | Telecommunication networks | en |
dc.subject | Machine design | en |
dc.subject | Altruistic | en |
dc.subject | Internet based computing | en |
dc.subject | Internet-based computing | en |
dc.subject | Malicious | en |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | en |
dc.subject | Rational workers | en |
dc.subject | Unreliable communication | en |
dc.title | Algorithmic mechanisms for internet supercomputing under unreliable communication | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/NCA.2011.46 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 275 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 280 | |
dc.author.faculty | 002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science | |
dc.type.uhtype | Conference Object | en |
dc.description.notes | <p>Sponsors: Technical Committee on Distributed Processing | en |
dc.description.notes | IEEE Computer Society | en |
dc.description.notes | Akamai | en |
dc.description.notes | Irianc | en |
dc.description.notes | Conference code: 87009 | en |
dc.description.notes | Cited By :3</p> | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Georgiou, Chryssis [0000-0003-4360-0260] | |
dc.contributor.orcid | Fernández Anta, Antonio [0000-0001-6501-2377] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0003-4360-0260 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-6501-2377 | |