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dc.contributor.authorGelastou, Marinaen
dc.contributor.authorMavronicolas, Mariosen
dc.contributor.authorLesta, Vicky Papadopoulouen
dc.contributor.authorPhilippou, Annaen
dc.contributor.authorSpirakis, Paul G.en
dc.creatorGelastou, Marinaen
dc.creatorMavronicolas, Mariosen
dc.creatorLesta, Vicky Papadopoulouen
dc.creatorPhilippou, Annaen
dc.creatorSpirakis, Paul G.en
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-13T10:40:08Z
dc.date.available2019-11-13T10:40:08Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.isbn0-7695-2541-5
dc.identifier.isbn978-0-7695-2541-9
dc.identifier.urihttp://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/53969
dc.description.abstractWe consider a security problem on a distributed network. We assume a network whose nodes are vulnerable to infection by threats (e.g. viruses), the attackers. A system security software, the defender, is available in the system. However, due to the network's size, economic and performance reasons, it is capable to provide safety, i.e. clean nodes from the possible presence of attackers, only to a limited part of it. The objective of the defender is to place itself in such a way as to maximize the number of attackers caught, while each attacker aims not to be caught. In [7], a basic case of this problem was modeled as a non-cooperative game, called the Edge model. There, the defender could protect a single link of the network. Here, we consider a more general case of the problem where the defender is able to scan and protect a set of k links of the network, which we call the Tuple model. It is natural to expect that this increased power of the defender should result in a better quality of protection for the network. Ideally, this would be achieved at little expense on the existence and complexity of Nash equilibria (profiles where no entity can improve its local objective unilaterally by switching placements on the network). In this paper we study pure and mixed Nash equilibria in the model. In particular, we propose algorithms for computing such equilibria in polynomial time and we provide a polynomial-time transformation of a special class of Nash equilibria, called matching equilibria, between the Edge model and the Tuple model, and vice versa. Finally, we establish that the increased power of the defender results in higher-quality protection of the network. © 2006 IEEE.en
dc.sourceProceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systemsen
dc.source26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, ICDCS 2006en
dc.source.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-44949263849&doi=10.1109%2fICDCSW.2006.107&partnerID=40&md5=6ff051d680bd97c4162b7079f4ca6ba1
dc.subjectMathematical transformationsen
dc.subjectTelecommunication networksen
dc.subjectPolynomialsen
dc.subjectSystem securityen
dc.subjectComputer virusesen
dc.subjectComputer systemsen
dc.subjectPolynomial approximationen
dc.subject(algorithmic) complexityen
dc.subjectPower qualityen
dc.subjectDistributed networksen
dc.subjectinternational conferencesen
dc.subjectPolynomial-timeen
dc.subjectSingle linken
dc.subject(Liquid + liquid) equilibriumen
dc.subjectDistributed computing systemsen
dc.subjectElectric breakdownen
dc.subjectGeneral (CO)en
dc.subjectNash equilibrium (NE)en
dc.subjectNon cooperative gamesen
dc.subjectQuality of protection (QoP)en
dc.subjectSpecial classen
dc.titleThe power of the defenderen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICDCSW.2006.107
dc.author.faculty002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences
dc.author.departmentΤμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science
dc.type.uhtypeConference Objecten
dc.description.notes<p>Conference code: 72239en
dc.description.notesCited By :5</p>en
dc.contributor.orcidSpirakis, Paul G. [0000-0001-5396-3749]
dc.contributor.orcidLesta, Vicky Papadopoulou [0000-0003-2920-8473]
dc.gnosis.orcid0000-0001-5396-3749
dc.gnosis.orcid0000-0003-2920-8473


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