The complexity of pure equilibria in mix-weighted congestion games on parallel links
SourceInformation Processing Letters
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We revisit the simple class of weighted congestion games on parallel links , where each player has a non-negative weight and her cost on the link she chooses is the sum of the weights of all players choosing the link. We extend this class to mix-weighted congestion games on parallel links, where weights may as well be negative. For the resulting simple class, we study the complexity of deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium, where no player could unilaterally improve her cost by switching to another link. We show that even for a single negative weight, this decision problem is strongly NP-complete when the number of links is part of the inputthe problem is NP-complete already for two links. When the number of links is a fixed constant, we show, through a pseudopolynomial, dynamic programming algorithm, that the problem is not strongly NP-complete unless P=NPthe algorithm works for any number of negative weights. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. Allrightsreserved.