dc.contributor.author | Mavronicolas, Marios | en |
dc.contributor.author | Monien, Burkhard | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wagner, K. W. | en |
dc.creator | Mavronicolas, Marios | en |
dc.creator | Monien, Burkhard | en |
dc.creator | Wagner, K. W. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-13T10:41:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-13T10:41:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/54514 | |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce a new class of succinct games, called weighted boolean formula games. Here, each player has a set of boolean formulas he wants to get satisfied. The boolean formulas of all players involve a ground set of boolean variables, and every player controls some of these variables. The payoff of a player is the weighted sum of the values of his boolean formulas. We consider pure Nash equilibria [18] and their well-studied refinement of payoff-dominant equilibria [12], where every player is no-worse-off than in any other pure Nash equilibrium. We study both structural and complexity properties for both decision and search problems. - We consider a subclass of weighted boolean formula games, called mutual weighted boolean formula games, which make a natural mutuality assumption. We present a very simple exact potential for mutual weighted boolean formula games. We also prove that each weighted, linear-affine (network) congestion game with player-specific constants is polynomial, sound monomorphic to a mutual weighted boolean formula game. In a general way, we prove that each weighted, linear-affine (network) congestion game with player-specific coefficients and constants is polynomial, sound monomorphic to a weighted boolean formula game. - We present a comprehensive collection of high intractability results. These results show that the computational complexity of decision (and search) problems for both payoff-dominant and pure Nash equilibria in weighted boolean formula games depends in a crucial way on five parameters: (i) the number of players | en |
dc.description.abstract | (ii) the number of variables per player | en |
dc.description.abstract | (iii) the number of boolean formulas per player | en |
dc.description.abstract | (iv) the weights in the payoff functions (whether identical or nonidentical), and (v) the syntax of the boolean formulas. These results show that decision problems for payoff-dominant equilibria are considerably harder than for pure Nash equilibria (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007. | en |
dc.source | 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007 | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-38449085286&partnerID=40&md5=0ed9c86d68d0ac31ca2d0ea6d2f0a248 | |
dc.subject | Problem solving | en |
dc.subject | Game theory | en |
dc.subject | Search engines | en |
dc.subject | Decision theory | en |
dc.subject | Congestion control (communication) | en |
dc.subject | Nash equilibria | en |
dc.subject | Boolean algebra | en |
dc.subject | Boolean formulas | en |
dc.subject | Payoff-dominant equilibria | en |
dc.subject | Weighted boolean formula games | en |
dc.title | Weighted boolean formula games | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.description.volume | 4858 LNCS | en |
dc.description.startingpage | 469 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 481 | |
dc.author.faculty | 002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.description.notes | <p>Conference code: 71244 | en |
dc.description.notes | Cited By :12</p> | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. | en |