From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points
Date
2018ISBN
978-3-319-93369-6Publisher
Springer International PublishingPlace of publication
ChamSource
Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-RealismPages
71-95Google Scholar check
Metadata
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In a recent paper Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau argue that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called “moral fixed points.” I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. In particular, epistemic fixed points exhibit the four “marks” of conceptual truths that they identify and can be utilised to address important challenges to epistemic realism. I conclude that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points.