dc.contributor.author | Kyriacou, Christos | en |
dc.creator | Kyriacou, Christos | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-22T11:39:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-22T11:39:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/62610 | |
dc.description.abstract | Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ (cf. Griffiths and Wilkins (2012, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic norm. The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling ‘companions in guilt arguments’. Finally, I consider ‘the core reductionist objection’ to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a brief response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized. | en |
dc.source | Synthese | en |
dc.title | Evolutionary Debunking: The Milvian Bridge Destabilized | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11229-017-1555-0 | |
dc.description.volume | 196 | |
dc.description.issue | 7 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 2695 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 2713 | |
dc.author.faculty | Φιλοσοφική Σχολή / Faculty of Letters | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Κλασικών Σπουδών και Φιλοσοφίας / Department of Classics and Philosophy | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Synthese | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Kyriacou, Christos [0000-0002-1506-1602] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0002-1506-1602 | |