Hamilton’s Principle and Dispositional Essentialism: Friends or Foes?
Date
2018ISSN
1572-8587Source
Journal for General Philosophy of ScienceVolume
49Issue
1Pages
59-71Google Scholar check
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Most recently Smart and Thébault revived an almost forgotten debate between Katzav and Ellis on the compatibility of Hamilton’s Principle (HP) with Dispositional Essentialism (DE). Katzav’s arguments inter alia aim to show that HP (a) presupposes a kind of metaphysical contingency which is at odds with the basic tenets of DE, and (b) offers explanations of a different type and direction from those given by DE. In this paper I argue that though dispositional essentialists might adequately respond to these arguments, the question about the compatibility of HP with DE has not been answered yet therefore, dispositional essentialists have not yet provided an illuminating DE-friendly metaphysical account of HP.