The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank’s supervisory activities in the context of the European Banking Union

Abstract

The European Central Bank emerged from the financial crisis not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as the most central and powerful supranational institution of our times. Besides being the Eurozone’s chief monetary authority, the European Central Bank now executes a critical role in prudential policy as the main supervisory entity of the European Banking Union. However, considering that in supervision the European Central Bank has a high level of independence as in monetary matters, concerns emerged on how to secure the European Central Bank’s accountability in this field. The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to examine whether the accountability arrangements that are laid down in the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation towards European Union institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Council, as well as towards national parliaments are enough to ensure the democratic accountability of the European Central Bank’s supervisory activities in the context of the European Banking Union. It should be noted that accountability is not only an instrument of democratic legitimacy but it is also a mechanism for ensuring that the European Central Bank carries out its tasks effectively, meaning ensure financial stability.