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dc.contributor.authorFeldmann, R.en
dc.contributor.authorMavronicolas, Mariosen
dc.contributor.authorPieris, Andreasen
dc.creatorFeldmann, R.en
dc.creatorMavronicolas, Mariosen
dc.creatorPieris, Andreasen
dc.description.abstractIn this work, we continue the study of the many facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, henceforth abbreviated as the FMNE Conjecture, in selfish routing for the special case of n identical users over two (identical) parallel links. We introduce a new measure of Social Cost, defined as the expectation of the square of the maximum congestion on a linken
dc.description.abstractwe call it Quadratic Maximum Social Cost. A Nash equilibrium is a stable state where no user can improve her (expected) latency by switching her mixed strategyen
dc.description.abstracta worst-case Nash equilibrium is one that maximizes Quadratic Maximum Social Cost. In the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, all mixed strategies achieve full support. Formulated within this framework is yet another facet of the FMNE Conjecture, which states that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the worst-case Nash equilibrium. We present an extensive proof of the FMNE Conjectureen
dc.description.abstractthe proof employs a combination of combinatorial arguments and analytical estimations. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009.en
dc.sourceTheory of Computing Systemsen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectGame theoryen
dc.subjectAnalytical estimationsen
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen
dc.subjectMixed strategyen
dc.subjectParallel linksen
dc.subjectSelfish routingen
dc.subjectSocial costen
dc.subjectStable stateen
dc.titleFacets of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjectureen
dc.description.endingpage112 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied SciencesΤμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science
dc.source.abbreviationTheory Comput.Syst.en

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