dc.contributor.author | Fotakis, Dimitris A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kontogiannis, Spyros C. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Koutsoupias, Elias | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mavronicolas, Marios | en |
dc.contributor.author | Spirakis, Paul G. | en |
dc.creator | Fotakis, Dimitris A. | en |
dc.creator | Kontogiannis, Spyros C. | en |
dc.creator | Koutsoupias, Elias | en |
dc.creator | Mavronicolas, Marios | en |
dc.creator | Spirakis, Paul G. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-13T10:40:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-13T10:40:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/53947 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of her own traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes her traffic on those links that minimize her expected latency cost, given the network congestion caused by the other users. The social cost of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over all links, latency through a link. We embark on a systematic study of several algorithmic problems related to the computation of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game we consider. In a nutshell, these problems relate to deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, constructing a Nash equilibrium, constructing the pure Nash equilibria of minimum and maximum social cost, and computing the social cost of a given mixed Nash equilibrium. Our work provides a comprehensive collection of efficient algorithms, hardness results, and structural results for these algorithmic problems. Our results span and contrast a wide range of assumptions on the syntax of the Nash equilibria and on the parameters of the system. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en |
dc.source | Theoretical Computer Science | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-67650970695&doi=10.1016%2fj.tcs.2008.01.004&partnerID=40&md5=e2dc7d86223f08874af1fc8624c062d6 | |
dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en |
dc.subject | Game theory | en |
dc.subject | Algorithms | en |
dc.subject | Wireless telecommunication systems | en |
dc.subject | Telecommunication networks | en |
dc.subject | Probability distributions | en |
dc.subject | Computational complexity | en |
dc.subject | Costs | en |
dc.subject | Systematic study | en |
dc.subject | Efficient algorithm | en |
dc.subject | Congestion control (communication) | en |
dc.subject | Nash equilibria | en |
dc.subject | Mixed strategy | en |
dc.subject | Parallel links | en |
dc.subject | Selfish routing | en |
dc.subject | Social cost | en |
dc.subject | Algorithmic game theory | en |
dc.subject | Algorithmic problems | en |
dc.subject | Combinatorial structures | en |
dc.subject | Hardness result | en |
dc.subject | Latency costs | en |
dc.subject | Network congestions | en |
dc.subject | Pure Nash equilibrium | en |
dc.subject | Random choice | en |
dc.title | The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004 | |
dc.description.volume | 410 | |
dc.description.issue | 36 | |
dc.description.startingpage | 3305 | |
dc.description.endingpage | 3326 | |
dc.author.faculty | 002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.description.notes | <p>Cited By :27</p> | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | Theor.Comput.Sci. | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Kontogiannis, Spyros C. [0000-0002-8559-6418] | |
dc.contributor.orcid | Spirakis, Paul G. [0000-0001-5396-3749] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0002-8559-6418 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-5396-3749 | |