dc.contributor.author | Fernández Anta, Antonio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Georgiou, Chryssis | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mosteiro, Miguel A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pareja, D. | en |
dc.creator | Fernández Anta, Antonio | en |
dc.creator | Georgiou, Chryssis | en |
dc.creator | Mosteiro, Miguel A. | en |
dc.creator | Pareja, D. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-13T10:40:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-13T10:40:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1932-6203 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://gnosis.library.ucy.ac.cy/handle/7/53929 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers' decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experimentally mixed equilibria aiming to attain better reliability-profit trade-offs. For a wide range of parameter values that may be used in practice, our simulations show that, in fact, both master and workers are better off using a pure equilibrium where no worker cheats, even under collusion, and even for colluding behaviors that involve deviating from the game. © 2015 Fernández Anta et al. | en |
dc.source | PLoS ONE | en |
dc.source.uri | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84925863421&doi=10.1371%2fjournal.pone.0116520&partnerID=40&md5=b44ad8e0cae55dc4a63a675a497dab4f | |
dc.subject | mathematical model | en |
dc.subject | decision making | en |
dc.subject | Algorithms | en |
dc.subject | human | en |
dc.subject | Humans | en |
dc.subject | algorithm | en |
dc.subject | Article | en |
dc.subject | computer analysis | en |
dc.subject | probability | en |
dc.subject | reliability | en |
dc.subject | simulation | en |
dc.subject | computer simulation | en |
dc.subject | mathematical analysis | en |
dc.subject | calculation | en |
dc.subject | Computing Methodologies | en |
dc.subject | crowdsourcing | en |
dc.subject | game | en |
dc.subject | Game Theory | en |
dc.title | Algorithmic mechanisms for reliable crowdsourcing computation under collusion | en |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1371/journal.pone.0116520 | |
dc.description.volume | 10 | |
dc.description.issue | 3 | |
dc.author.faculty | 002 Σχολή Θετικών και Εφαρμοσμένων Επιστημών / Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences | |
dc.author.department | Τμήμα Πληροφορικής / Department of Computer Science | |
dc.type.uhtype | Article | en |
dc.description.notes | <p>Cited By :1</p> | en |
dc.source.abbreviation | PLoS ONE | en |
dc.contributor.orcid | Georgiou, Chryssis [0000-0003-4360-0260] | |
dc.contributor.orcid | Fernández Anta, Antonio [0000-0001-6501-2377] | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0003-4360-0260 | |
dc.gnosis.orcid | 0000-0001-6501-2377 | |